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We use new data on entries and exits of US daily newspapers from 1869 to 2004 to estimate effects
on political participation, party vote shares, and electoral competitiveness. Our identification strategy
exploits the precise timing of these events and allows for the possibility of confounding trends. We
find that newspapers have a robust positive effect on political participation, with one additional newspaper
increasing both presidential and congressional turnout by approximately 0.3 percentage points. Newspaper
competition is not a key driver of turnout: our effect is driven mainly by the first newspaper in a market,
and the effect of a second or third paper is significantly smaller. The effect on presidential turnout
diminishes after the introduction of radio and television, while the estimated effect on congressional
turnout remains similar up to recent years. We find no evidence that partisan newspapers affect party
vote shares, with confidence intervals that rule out even moderate-sized effects. We find no clear evidence
that newspapers systematically help or hurt incumbents.
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The opening or closing of newspapers has long been linked to the health of democracy. De Toc-
queville saw the large number of US newspapers in 1831 as key to the country’s broad political
participation (2003 [1831]). Contemporaries thought the growing number of newspapers in the late
nineteenth century was strengthening democracy (Eliot 1897 [1894]; Reid 1872), while both pol-
icy makers (Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo 1973; Federal Communications Commission
2003) and scholars (Bagdikian 2000) have worried that the closing of competitive newspapers in
the twentieth century has weakened it. In recent years, the possibility that the Internet may lead to
further newspaper closures has provoked concerns about falling political participation (Schulhofer-
Wohl and Garrido 2009), increased ideological polarization (Sunstein 2007), and the elimination
of a check on government corruption (Starr 2009).
Theory suggests three important channels by which news media may affect political outcomes.
First, media disseminate information about politics, which may in turn increase political partici-
pation (Feddersen 2004; Putnam 2000). Second, media may persuade voters to support particular
parties or polities, or indirectly shift party support by affecting which issues are salient (Graber
2000). Finally, media may affect the power of incumbents, for example by informing voters about
corruption or other dimensions of performance, and giving a platform to challengers who might
be shut out of alternative communication channels (Besley and Prat 2006). All three of these ar-
guments have been central justiﬁcations for a long history of policies to subsidize media, promote
competition, and guarantee ideological diversity (Starr 2004; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2008).
In this paper, we use a new panel of US daily newspapers from 1869 to 2004 to look di-
rectly at how entries and exits of newspapers affect political participation, party vote shares, and
incumbency advantage. We focus our analysis on the years 1869-1928, when newspapers were
a uniquely important source of political information. We use the remaining years of the data to
study how the effect of newspapers changes after the introduction of radio and television. Our
data include every general-circulation English-language daily newspaper published in the US over
this period. We observe papers’ location, circulation, and, in the early years of our sample, po-
litical afﬁliation. We supplement this data with search-based measures of newspaper content, and
county-level electoral data. We observe a total of 3913 county-years with net newspaper entry and
3303 county-years with net newspaper exit. Importantly, our data cover a period in which many
markets have two or more competing newspapers, allowing us to study the way media effects vary
with both competitiveness and ideological diversity.
2Our identiﬁcation strategy exploits the fact that exits and entries cause large, discrete changes
in newspaper readership. Trends in readership before or after such an event are small relative to the
effect of the event itself. We observe more than a thousand cases in which the only daily newspaper
in a county either opens or closes. Our basic strategy is to look at changes in political outcomes in
counties that experience an entry or exit relative to other counties in the same state and year that
do not. To address the possibility of a spurious relationship, we ﬁrst discuss theory and evidence
on the determinants of newspaper proﬁts and the extent to which they could be correlated with
the political outcomes of interest. We then plot changes in the outcomes in years before or after
entry and exit events to conﬁrm that the effects we ﬁnd are driven by sharp “on-impact” changes,
that any associated trends match the predictions of theory, and that the pattern of leads and lags is
inconsistent with unobserved shocks to economic or political variables driving our key ﬁndings.
We ﬁrst study the effect of newspapers on political participation. Prior evidence suggests that
any bias from omitted variables in this case is likely to work against ﬁnding a positive effect. The
most important driver of entries and exits is simply changes in population, and a robust ﬁnding of
prior studies is that population growth is negatively correlated with turnout, presumably because
newcomers vote less often than longtime residents. Income growth, another important driver of
newspaperproﬁts, isalsonegativelyrelatedtoturnout. Variousfactssuggestthatshockstopolitical
interest are not themselves a primary driver of proﬁts. Consistent with this evidence, we ﬁnd that
turnout tends to decline in the years before and after the entry of a newspaper, a trend that we can
largely explain with observable covariates. In the period of an entry, on the other hand, we see
sharp increases in turnout. We argue that the economics of the entry and exit decision make such
a pattern highly unlikely in the absence of a true causal effect, even if, contrary to the evidence,
there were large shocks to newspaper proﬁts that also had a positive effect on turnout. As an
additional placebo test, we look at entries and exits of explicitly non-political newspapers. These
events should not affect political outcomes, yet are driven by the same economic forces that drive
entries and exits of political papers. We do not see any signiﬁcant changes in turnout around these
events.
We conclude that newspapers have a robust positive effect on political participation. In the
years 1869-1928, one additional newspaper increases presidential turnout by 0:3 percentage points.
This effect is similar for congressional and presidential elections, and is robust to a range of alter-
native speciﬁcations. Turning to the role of competition, we ﬁnd that the effect of the ﬁrst entrant to
a market on turnout is 1:0 percentage point, while the effect of later entrants is signiﬁcantly smaller.
The competition results are consistent with the hypothesis that all turnout effects are proportional
3to the effect on the share of eligible voters reading at least one paper, and imply that reading a
newspaper increases the probability of voting by 4 percentage points. The effect of newspapers on
presidential turnout diminishes after the introduction of radio and television, while the effect on
congressional turnout remains similar up to recent years.
We next study the effect of partisan newspapers on Republican and Democratic vote shares.
These speciﬁcations exploit the fact that a large fraction of newspapers in the early part of our
sample declare explicit party afﬁliations, which we show predict large differences in newspapers’
content and endorsements. Here, the likely source of omitted variables bias pushes toward ﬁnding
a spurious persuasive effect: entering newspapers are relatively more likely to choose a Republi-
can afﬁliation in markets that are trending Republican for other reasons. Our data conﬁrms that
Republican entries are associated with positive state-level pre- and post-trends in Republican vote
share. Such trends are eliminated, however, by the inclusion of state-year ﬁxed effects. We ﬁnd
no systematic changes in party vote shares contemporaneous with the entry or exit of partisan pa-
pers. We argue that the economics of the underlying problem make it unlikely that even an omitted
driver of Republican entry that is negatively correlated with the Republican vote share could mask
a true causal effect and produce the pattern of coefﬁcients we see.
We conclude that partisan newspapers do not have large effects on party vote shares. Our point
estimate on the effect of a Republican newspaper’s entry or exit on the Republican presidential
vote share is very close to zero, with a conﬁdence interval that rules out effects greater than 0:5
percentage points. We can reject the hypothesis that partisan newspapers convince 3 percent or
more of their readers to change their votes. Our ﬁndings are similar (though less precise) for vote
shares in congressional elections, do not vary signiﬁcantly according to the extent of competition,
are consistent over time, and survive a variety of robustness checks.
In the ﬁnal section of the paper, we assess whether newspapers increase or decrease incum-
bency advantage. Our priors are more diffuse in this case about the sign and magnitude of possible
bias. Our point estimates are consistent with newspapers reducing the vote share advantage of
incumbents, and with newspapers making it less likely that congressional incumbents will run un-
opposed. The coefﬁcients are not statistically signiﬁcant, however, and the overall pattern of results
is not precise enough to infer a causal relationship.
Taken together, our results are consistent with a model in which newspapers affect the political
process primarily by providing information about issues, candidates, and elections. Newspapers
had large effects on participation in the period when there were few alternative sources of infor-
mation available. The introduction of new media such as television that provide a good substitute
4for information about national politics was associated with a reduction in newspapers’ impact on
national turnout but not on more local congressional races. Second and third newspapers have
smaller effects than ﬁrst papers, which is unsurprising if later entrants have a smaller marginal
effect on the total information available in the market. Our failure to ﬁnd strong effects of partisan
papers on party vote shares is consistent with consumers ﬁltering partisan information when it is
clearly labeled as such, and also with newspapers choosing their afﬁliations to match consumers
existing beliefs. That newspapers do not systematically help or hurt incumbents makes sense given
that theory predicts ambiguous effects of improved information on incumbency advantage (Gordon
and Landa 2009).
A large theoretical literature studies the conditions under which greater competition and di-
versity of incentives among experts improves the functioning of information markets (see, e.g.,
Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Krishna and Morgan, 2001; Che and Kartik 2009). Several papers ex-
plore related questions in the context of media competition (e.g., Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005;
Besley and Prat 2006; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006). Ours is the ﬁrst large-scale study to relate
changes over time in news market structure to outcomes that are plausibly connected to market
performance.
This paper also contributes to a growing empirical literature on the political effects of media.1
Stromberg (2004), Gentzkow (2006), and Snyder and Stromberg (2008) study effects of media on
turnout, and ﬁnd results consistent with our ﬁnding of a positive effect of newspapers. In a closely
related paper, Schulhofer-Wohl and Garrido (2009) use within-city variation in circulation to study
the effect of the closure of the Cincinnati Post on voter turnout and incumbent success. Our ﬁnding
of limited persuasive effects of partisan newspapers contrasts with ﬁndings of larger persuasive
effects in DellaVigna and Kaplan’s (2007) study of Fox News, Gerber, Karlan and Bergan’s (2009)
study of the Washington Post and Washington Times, and Carson and Hood’s (2008) study of the
partisan press in the early nineteenth century. Our results on political competitiveness relate to
work by Prior (2006) and Ansolabehere, Snowberg and Snyder (2006), who ﬁnd mixed evidence
on the effect of television on incumbency advantage. Our study differs from past work in the large
sample of media outlets we cover, our identiﬁcation from sharp entry and exit events, our ability to
study these effects over a long time period that includes years where newspapers were the primary
source of political information, and our ability to study the effect of competition and ideological
diversity.
1In addition to the studies mentioned here, there is a large political science literature on media effects. See Graber
(2000) for a review.
5Section 2 below describes the data used in our study. Section 3 provides background on the
political content of newspapers and the determinants of newspaper entry and exit. Section 4 lays
out our empirical strategy and discusses identiﬁcation. Section 5 presents results on political par-
ticipation, section 6 presents results on party vote shares, and section 7 presents results on political
competitiveness. Section 8 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 US Newspaper Panel
We collect data from annual directories of US newspapers from 1869 and from every presidential
year from 1872 to 2004, inclusive. The data for 1869 through 1876 come from G. Rowell & Co’s
American Newspaper Directory. The data for 1880 through 1928 come from N. W. Ayer & Son’s
American Newspaper Annual. The data for 1932 through 2004 come from the Editor & Publisher
Yearbook. Although lists of newspapers were compiled in some earlier years, we are not aware of
any regularly published directory of daily newspapers prior to 1869. Since our analysis will focus
on presidential years, we treat the 1869 data as a measure of the newspapers that existed in 1868.
(Dropping 1869 from the data does not affect our central conclusions.)
Newspaper directories are standard sources for historical research on US newspapers, but have
not before been digitized on such a large scale. They originated as a guide to potential advertisers
and were intended to be complete. Counts of daily newspapers from these sources are similar to
independent tabulations performed by the US Census (Lee 1937).
In each year, we extract the name, city, time of day, and circulation of every English-language
daily newspaper. We match newspapers across years on the basis of their title, city, and time of day.
We match cities to Census place deﬁnitions and match each Census place to the county containing
the largest share of the place’s population.
For each county-year, we compute the number of English-language daily newspapers, which
serves as our ﬁrst key independent variable.
From the data on circulation, we construct an estimate of the share of eligible voters reading at
least one newspaper in each county in each year. The number of individuals reading diverges from
the total number of copies circulated for two reasons: many individuals read more than one paper
on a given day, and many copies of a given paper are read by more than one individual. Consistent
with estimates of the ratio of reported readership to circulation in both historical readership surveys
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We then assume that for any two papers A and B, the share of A’s readers who also read B is equal
to the share reading B in the overall population. This is a highly stylized model of newspaper
demand, but it approximates the patterns of readership overlap in several historical case studies,
and it is a reasonable approximation to the demand structure estimated in Gentzkow (2007). We
consider readership to be missing if any newspapers are missing data on circulation in a given
county-year.
We also extract the political afﬁliation of each newspaper in our sample. We discuss the mean-
ing of these afﬁliations in section 3 below. The vast majority of afﬁliations are “Democratic,”
“Republican,” or “Independent,” with the share of Independent afﬁliations growing over time. We
deﬁne a time-constant measure of afﬁliation for each newspaper, where papers are classiﬁed as
Republican if they ever declare a Republican afﬁliation and Democratic if they ever declare a
Democratic afﬁliation. In the handful of cases where a newspaper declares a Republican afﬁliation
in one year and a Democratic afﬁliation in another, we use the majority afﬁliation. Our ﬁnal sam-
ple includes 2566 papers which we classify as Republican, 2431 which we classify as Democratic,
1714 which we classify as Independent, and 1063 which never report an afﬁliation.
For each county-year, we compute the difference in the number of Republican and Democratic
newspapers, which serves as our second key independent variable.
A small number of newspapers identify a special emphasis in their content. We use these de-
scriptorstoclassifysomenewspapers—suchascommercial, ﬁnancial, legal, ortradepublications—
as “non-political” in the sense that they likely do not emphasize political news. Consistent with
our classiﬁcation, we ﬁnd that 75 percent of non-political newspapers never declare themselves as
Republican, Democratic, or Independent, as against only 11 percent for other (“political”) news-
papers.
We discuss further details of the construction of our data in appendix A.
Figure 1 gives an overview of our data. Panel A shows the number of daily newspapers by year.
Panel B shows the number of counties with one, two, and three or more newspapers.
2.2 Measures of Newspaper Content
We collect text-based data on the political content of newspapers in our sample from the website
newspaperarchive.com. This website has digitized content of roughly 1700 newspapers between
1872 and 1928, although for the vast majority of these papers it has only a small number of issues.
For each newspaper, for each presidential election in these years, and for each party, we search
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idential candidates and at least one of the words “Nominee,” “Candidate,” “Nomination,” “Race,”
“Ticket,” “Election,” or “Campaign.” We then compute the share of all candidate mentions that go
to the Republican candidate. Our searches return hits for 137 unique newspapers, of which 52 are
Democratic and 72 are Republican. The total number of hits over all years is 66489.
As an additional measure of newspapers’ political leanings, we collect data on newspapers’
presidential endorsements for the years 1932-2004 from Editor & Publisher Magazine’s “Roll
Call” survey. The survey, published annually, is based on questionnaires mailed to newspaper
editors asking them which party their paper endorsed for president.
2.3 Voting and Demographic Data
We match each county-year observation to data on voting from various sources through 2004 (see
appendix B). These data include the total number of votes cast by party and county in each election
for president, congress, governor, and senator. We measure turnout as the ratio of total votes to
eligible voters, where the number of eligible voters is interpolated using Census demographic data.
The data also include the party of the incumbent candidate in each election, if any.
Our analysis focuses on presidential elections and congressional elections in presidential elec-
tion years. We also perform some analysis of congressional turnout in off-year elections. We
compute the change in off-year turnout as the change in turnout between the election two years
after the current presidential year and the election two years prior to the previous presidential elec-
tion year. This approach introduces some noise but guarantees that the newspaper entries and exits
we measure occur strictly between the off-year elections.
In the online appendix, we present additional ﬁndings from gubernatorial and senate elections.
We obtain county-level demographic data from the US Census and County Data Books (ICPSR
2896), supplemented with data from NHGIS.org. We compute the share of the population that is
white, the share of the white population that is foreign-born, the share of the population that is
males 21 and older, the share of the population living in cities with 25,000+ residents, the share
of the population living in towns with 2,500+ residents, and the population employed in manufac-
turing as a share of males 21 and older. For each measure, we interpolate both the numerator and
denominator between Census years using a natural cubic spline (Herriot and Reinsch 1973) and
divide the two to obtain an estimate of the relevant share. We also use data from the Census on the
deﬁnition of Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas as of 1990.
We use manufacturing output per capita as a proxy for income. This gives us a comparable
8county-level income proxy across our entire sample. To validate this measure, we have compared it
at the state level to Easterlin’s (1960) reckoning of total income per capita in 1900. The correlation
between the two measures is 0:49 for all states, and 0:76 when we remove three outlier states.
2.4 Sample Selection and Market Deﬁnition
We exclude outlier observations with changes in turnout per eligible voter greater than 1 in abso-
lute value. These implausible values represent less than 0:1 percent of the cases in the data, and
excluding them improves precision. Our results are also robust to excluding the most inﬂuential
observations as measured by DFBETA inﬂuence statistics.
We restrict attention to counties that experience at least one four-year period in which the
number of newspapers increases or decreases during our sample period. Doing so increases the
homogeneity of the sample by, for example, excluding counties that never have newspapers. On
average during our sample period, the voting-eligible population in excluded counties is one quar-
ter as large as in the included counties, and a formal likelihood-ratio test rejects the hypothesis that
state-year effects are identical for included and excluded counties. Including the excluded counties
in our sample reduces precision slightly, but leaves our central ﬁndings unchanged.
Our analysis deﬁnes the news market to be a county. We do this because county is the smallest
unit at which we can disaggregate presidential election data over such a long period. In fact, some
counties contain multiple news markets (cities), and newspapers also circulate across nearby coun-
ties. Calculations from Gentzkow and Shapiro’s (forthcoming) data show that, today, the median
newspaper sells more than 80 percent of its copies in the county in which it is headquartered, and
the median county in which at least one newspaper is headquartered gets more than 80 percent
of its copies from in-county newspapers. If improvements in transportation technology mean that
news distribution is at least as geographically dispersed today than in the past, these calculations
indicate that counties will be a reasonable approximation of news markets in most cases. In ap-
pendix C we repeat our analysis on the subsample of counties that contain only one news market
each and are not in metropolitan areas, which we expect to eliminate most cases in which county
is a poor approximation.
We divide the data into three time periods: the newspaper period (1872-1928), the radio period
(1932-1952), and the television period (1956-2004). These years are chosen so that the radio and
television periods each begin in the ﬁrst presidential election in which the respective technology
had a national penetration in excess of 50 percent (Sterling 1984). We conduct our main analysis
on the newspaper period, and report results on how our estimates vary across these three time
9periods.
3 Background
3.1 Political Content and Party Afﬁliation
Newspapers were an important source of political information throughout our sample period. The
historical record is clearest on their role in presidential elections. Newspapers were central players
in the political process in the late 19th century (Kaplan 2002). Newspapers in the 1890s devoted
20-40 percent of their coverage to politics (Baldasty 1992), with electoral coverage tilted signiﬁ-
cantly toward presidential contests (Kernell and Jacobson 1987). Newspapers’ relative importance
was reduced substantially by the introduction of radio in the late 1920s. Radio coverage of pres-
idential campaigns began in 1924, and expanded dramatically in the 1930s (Sterling and Kittross
2002). By 1939, 40 percent of respondents to a Roper survey chose radio as “the most believable
news medium,” as compared to 27 percent for newspapers. In 1944—still before the widespread
diffusion of television—twice as many respondents chose radio as the most accurate source of in-
formation about the presidential campaign as chose newspapers (National Election Study 1944).
Beginning in the late 1940s, television eclipsed both newspapers and radio as a source of infor-
mation about presidential campaigns. Survey evidence from the 1950s-1970s show that roughly
twice as many people chose television as their most important source of information about presi-
dential campaigns as chose newspapers, and evidence from the National Election Study shows that
a similar pattern continued through the later twentieth century (Gentzkow 2006).
Evidence on newspaper coverage of state and local elections is more limited. Historical ac-
counts and content analysis show that congressional and state politics were an important part of
day-to-day newspaper coverage in the nineteenth century (Kaplan 2002; Kernell and Jacobson
1987). We are not aware of any survey evidence on the extent to which radio provided a substi-
tute for newspapers in the coverage of these elections in the 1930s and 40s, although radio did
devote signiﬁcant attention to them (Sterling and Kittross 2002). What is clear, however, is that
newspapers remained the most important source of information about state and local politics in
the television era. Survey respondents in the 1950s-70s ranked newspapers as the most impor-
tant source of information about local elections. Newspapers were also rated as more important
than television for information about non-presidential elections in the 1970s and 1980s. Mondak
(1995) showed that a 1992 newspaper strike in Pittsburgh was associated with substantial declines
10in knowledge of candidates and issues in the congressional campaign, but not in the presidential
campaign. Snyder and Stromberg (2008) provide econometric evidence that newspapers signiﬁ-
cantly inﬂuence knowledge of congressional candidates.
During our main sample period, it was common practice for newspapers to declare an explicit
afﬁliation with a political party (Hamilton 2006; Gentzkow, Glaeser and Goldin 2006). Afﬁliated
newspapers were explicit in representing their party’s point of view. For example, in 1868, the
Democratic Detroit Free Press announced, “The Free Press alone in this State is able to combine a
Democratic point of view of our state politics and local issues with those of national importance”
(Kaplan 2002, 23). Similarly, in 1872, the Republican Detroit Post declared as its mission “To
meet the demands of the Republicans of Michigan and to advance their cause” (Kaplan 2002, 22).
Gentzkow, Glaeser and Goldin (2006) present case studies demonstrating that both the tone and the
substance of coverage of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century political scandals differed greatly
by afﬁliation. Mott (1950), Summers (1994), and Kaplan (2002) provide additional detail on the
sharp content differences between Republican and Democratic papers.
Content measures from automated searches of news text conﬁrm a strong relationship between
a newspaper’s afﬁliation and the partisan slant of its content. Column (1) of table 2 shows that on
average Republican newspapers devote 48 percent of mentions to the Republican ticket, as com-
pared to 30 percent for Democratic newspapers. The difference is highly statistically signiﬁcant.
Column (2) shows that the association between afﬁliation and content remains large after control-
ling for the Republican vote share in the market, suggesting that afﬁliation is capturing variation
in content above and beyond reader views, at least as proxied by the vote share.
Content measures also support our approach to classifying newspaper afﬁliations, in which we
consider a newspaper as partisan if it ever declares a partisan afﬁliation. Columns (3) and (4) of
table 2 show that for papers that currently declare an Independent afﬁliation, the relationship be-
tween content and historical afﬁliation remains strong. Our data on newspaper endorsements also
conﬁrm that even in the later years of our sample (when most papers are nominally Independent),
papers with a historical Republican afﬁliation have signiﬁcantly different content than papers with
a historical Democratic afﬁliation. Over the years 1932-2004, historically Democratic papers en-
dorsed Republican candidates 45 percent of the time, as compared to 90 percent of the time for
historically Republican papers.
113.2 Newspaper Entries and Exits
The central independent variable in our analysis is the change in the number of newspapers. We
observe a total of 3913 county-years with net newspaper entry and 3303 county-years with net
newspaper exit. Figure 2 shows the distribution of these net entries and net exits by year. The
ﬁgure makes clear that the number of events declines throughout the twentieth century, but remains
nontrivial even in recent years.
Table 1 breaks down these events by the number of papers before and after. We observe a large
number of entries and exits of monopoly newspapers, as well as a large number of changes in the
structure of competitive markets.
These events represent large discrete changes in the availability of local newspapers. Newspa-
pers enter large and remain large until the year before their exit. On average, circulation in the ﬁrst
year after entry is equal to 87 percent of a newspaper’s lifetime average circulation; circulation
in the last year before exit is equal to 115 percent of the lifetime average. We report below that
a typical entry increases readership in a county by about 13 percentage points. Entries and exits
are also associated with noticeable trends in the market for journalists. Between 1870 and 1880,
each additional daily newspaper opened is associated with an additional increase of 17 journalists
employed in the city, on a base of 50.
Entries and exits are also large events relative to the associated trends in circulation with which
they coincide. As we would expect, newspaper exits are preceded by unusually slow growth in
circulation, andnewspaperentriesarefollowedbyunusuallyfastgrowth. Thesefactsareconsistent
with stylized facts from life-cycle studies of ﬁrms in other industries (see, e.g., Troske 1996).
However, these trends tend to be on the order of a few percent, and are therefore dwarfed in size
by the impact of the entry or exit event itself.
To justify our identiﬁcation strategy, it is critical to understand the forces that cause entry and
exit. Contemporary (Brown 1929) and historical (Baldasty 1992; Hamilton 2006) accounts of this
period suggest two primary determinants of the number of newspapers in a market.
The ﬁrst is population. Newspapers have nontrivial ﬁxed costs (such as reporting and writing),
so market size is a major determinant of the number of newspapers in a market (Bresnahan and
Reiss 1991; Genesove 2003; Hamilton 2006). In our data, the average voting-eligible population
over our sample period explains 61 percent of the variation across counties in the average number
of daily newspapers. And, as we show below, the timing of entries and exits is strongly associated
with trends in population growth.
The second is income. Advertisers care about dollars spent, and richer areas can command
12greater advertising revenue per reader. Across counties, per-capita manufacturing output (our
proxy for income) is signiﬁcantly and positively correlated with the number of newspapers, and
entries and exits of newspapers are associated with corresponding trends in output.
A number of idiosyncratic “supply-side” factors also affect the proﬁtability of newspapers.
Costs vary dramatically with the local price of paper and ink. Variation in advertising demand at
both the local and national levels is a primary determinant of revenue. Early “how-to” guides to
newspaper publishing (e.g., Brown 1929) identify a number of other local factors that make areas
more or less attractive to potential entrants, such as the geographic location or administrative status
of a town, the extent of retail competition, the interest of particular publishers, and the availability
of ﬁnancing.
In some cases, political considerations also affected entry and exit decisions directly. Afﬁliated
papers sometimes received patronage from the parties they represented, typically in the form of
government printing contracts and the like (Kaplan 2002). There are also anecdotal examples of
newspaper entries that were motivated by political considerations (Nasaw 2001). Our reading of
the historical record suggests, however, that in most places and at most times during our sample
period commercial considerations were paramount (Brown 1929; Bogart 1981; Baldasty 1992;
Baldasty 1999).
Someofourestimatesexploitvariationinenteringandexitingnewspapers’partisanafﬁliations.
It is therefore important to understand the forces that affect newspapers’ afﬁliation choices. The
most obvious such factor is consumer ideology. Existing theory (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005;
Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006) and evidence (Hamilton 2006; Gentzkow and Shapiro forthcoming)
support the view that media content is tailored to the prior beliefs of consumers. The correlation
between consumer ideology and newspaper afﬁliation is strong in our sample: we can correctly
predict the afﬁliation choice of an entering newspaper 67 percent of the time solely based on
whether the Republican candidate got the majority in the newspaper’s county in the presidential
election prior to entry.
In each of the results sections below, we discuss the extent to which the various drivers of
entry and exit are correlated with our political outcomes of interest, and the implications for the
interpretation of our parameters.
134 Empirical Framework
4.1 Speciﬁcation
Let c index counties, s index states, and t 2 f1;:::;Tg index presidential election years (with one
time unit representing four calendar years). We model an outcome of interest yct, which could be
voter turnout, Republican vote share, or incumbent vote share.
Our key independent variable of interest is nct, which for now we deﬁne as the number of
newspapers in county c at time t. We will also study the effect of other features of the news
market, such as the degree of competition and the effect of newspapers’ political afﬁliations. In
such cases the change in notation is straightforward.
We assume that
yct = rc+bnct +gst +dxct +lzct +ect (1)
where rc is a county effect, gst is a state-year effect, xct is a vector of observable characteristics,d
is a vector of parameters, and ect is a county-year shock. The parameter b is the causal effect of
nct on yct.
The index zct denotes newspaper proﬁtability. The parameter l encodes the extent to which
newspaper proﬁtability is related to the political outcome yct conditional on nct, xct, rc, and gst.
We estimate the model in ﬁrst differences. We choose this speciﬁcation over one with county
ﬁxed effects because the data display highly persistent shocks. We let D be a ﬁrst difference
operator so that, for example, Dyct = yct  yc(t 1).
We treat gst as a state-year ﬁxed effect in estimation. Because of the electoral college system,
state-speciﬁcfactorsarelikelytobeimportantdriversofcounty-levelpoliticaloutcomes, andmany
of these factors (e.g., whether the state is a battleground) are likely unrelated to events in any given
county’s news market. Our estimates will thus be driven by the way political outcomes change in
counties that experience changes in the newspaper market relative to counties in the same state and
year that do not.
Unless otherwise noted, the vector of controls xct includes changes in the share of the popula-
tion that is white, the share of the white population that is foreign-born, the share of the population
that is 21+-year-old males, the share of the population living in cities with 25,000+ residents, the
share of the population living in towns with 2,500+ residents, the population employed in manu-
facturing as a share of 21+-year-old males, and the log of manufacturing output per capita (a proxy
for income).
144.2 Identiﬁcation
We will think of ect as a county-year shock to the outcome of interest that is unrelated to newspa-
pers’ proﬁts, and hence to newspapers’ entry and exit decisions. Formally, we assume that
E(Dect j Dgst;Dxct;Dzct;Dnct) = 0: (2)
Weassumethatnetnewspaperentryispositivelyrelatedtocontemporaneouschangesinnewspaper
proﬁts: Cov(Dzct;Dnct j Dgst;Dxct) > 0:
Identiﬁcation is straightforward if l = 0, i.e. if variation in newspaper proﬁtability is unrelated
to political outcomes once we condition on observable market characteristics and state-year ﬁxed
effects. This is most plausible if remaining variation in newspaper proﬁts comes from cost shocks
and other idiosyncratic commercial considerations.
We address the possibility that this assumption could be violated in three ways.
First, in each section of results we draw on theory and prior evidence to evaluate the likely sign
of l if it is nonzero. We argue in each case that any bias is likely to work against the results we
ﬁnd.
Second, we argue that identiﬁcation from the ﬁne timing of events limits bias even if l is
nonzero. Formally, we argue that the discreteness and irreversibility of newspaper entries and
exits means that variation in contemporaneous proﬁts Dzct will account for a small fraction of the
conditional variance in Dnct.
Third, we use pre-trends to test for remaining bias. We plot changes in the outcomes in years
before and after entry and exit events to conﬁrm that the effects we ﬁnd are driven by sharp “on-
impact” changes, that any other trends match our expectations regarding the sign of l, and that
such trends are largely eliminated by our controls.
Thesetechniquesarestandardin “differences-in-differences” studies. Wearguebelowthatthey
are especially compelling in our context in light of the economics of newspaper entry and exit.
4.2.1 Exploiting the Precise Timing of Entry and Exit
If l 6= 0, the magnitude of the omitted variables bias will depend on the conditional covariance
of Dnct and Dzct relative to the conditional variance of Dnct. If after conditioning on Dxct and Dgst
most of the variation in net newspaper entry is a function only of Dzct, the bias is severe. If, on the
other hand, the current proﬁt innovations Dzct explain only a small fraction of the variance in net
entry, the bias is small. The economics of the entry and exit decision mean the latter is the more
15likely case.
To ﬁx ideas, consider the following simple model. Suppose that zct evolves as a random walk.
In each county, a single newspaper that is out of the market at time zero decides in each period
whether or not to enter. Once it enters, it remains in the market forever. It is easy to show that the
optimal policy for the newspapers is to enter if and only if zct > zfor some cutoff z (Dixit and
Pindyck 1994).
For a given value of Dzct, Dnct depends on both the level of zc(t 1)and the value of the cutoff
z. A given increase in proﬁtability will only prompt the newspaper to enter if it happens to tip the
level of proﬁtability over the cutoff. There will be many periods where Dzct is large and no entry
occurs, and many other periods where Dzct is small but still causes an entry. Even though entries
depend only on zct, the current-period shock Dzct will explain a small share of the variance in Dnct.
To see this another way, consider an analogy with regression-discontinuity analysis. In a
regression-discontinuity design, assignment to treatment is determined by a score variable which
is potentially correlated with the outcome of interest. Treatment does not vary smoothly with the
score but instead turns on when it crosses a threshold. In a small window around the threshold, the
variation in treatment becomes arbitrarily large relative to the variation in the score that induces
it. In our setting, time is the analogue of the score variable. If b > 0, we expect entry and exit to
induce discontinuous changes in outcomes that are large relative to contemporaneous changes in
proﬁtability.
4.2.2 Diagnosing Bias Using Pre-trends
Pre-trends are a standard diagnostic for bias in panel data models. If the relationship between Dnct
and Dyct comes only from a causal effect, Dnct cannot be correlated with past values of Dyct. If the
observed relationship is driven by omitted components Dzct, Dnct and past values of Dyct may be
correlated.
This diagnostic is especially powerful in our setting because the economics of the entry and exit
decision implies that net entry in the current period should depend on both current and past values




>0 for k >0. Conditional
on the newspaper being out of the market at time t, the probability of entry is monotonically
increasing in the level of zct, so a positive innovation in Dzct increases the hazard rate of entry not
only in the current period but in every period in the future.2 This in turn implies that if l > 0, Dnct
2To conﬁrm this theoretical intuition in a richer model, we have simulated a special case of the entry and exit model
of Ericson and Pakes (1995) in which we turn off the possibility of investment and in which proﬁts depend on a single
16and past values of Dyct must be correlated.
Our data conﬁrm this intuition for important drivers of entry and exit. In panel A of ﬁgure 3





akDnc(t k)+Dgst +dDxct +Dect (3)
where zct is proxied with the log of the voting-eligible population and we abuse notation in deﬁning
the remaining terms as in equation (1). We plot coefﬁcients ak for k < 0 on the left-hand-side of
the plot, as these reﬂect the relationship between current changes in the number of newspapers and
past changes in population. We plot coefﬁcients ak for k > 0 on the right-hand-side of the plot,
as these reﬂect the relationship between current changes in the number of newspaper and future
changes in population.
Panel A of ﬁgure 3 shows that population growth is above average in the period in which a
newspaper enters (a0 > 0). The ﬁgure also shows that population growth is above average in the
periods prior to entry (ak > 0 for k < 0) and that it is almost as large in the period before entry as
in the entry period itself.
The ﬁgure also shows that population growth is above average in the periods immediately after
entry (ak > 0 for k > 0 ). This is not a property of our simple model because we assume that
proﬁtability follows a random walk, so that entry in the present cannot predict future growth in
population. In practice, population growth is highly serially correlated, so that newspaper entry in
response to past population growth is predictive of future population growth. Panel B of ﬁgure 3
illustrates this mechanism by plotting a “whitened” series of innovations to population constructed
to have no serial correlation.3 In this plot, ak = 0 for k > 0 by construction.
The fact that ak > 0 for k < 0 means that trends in outcomes of interest before an entry or exit
can be used to estimate the sign and magnitude of the likely bias in our estimate of b. Consider
estimating a model of the form of equation (3), but with an outcome of interest Dyct as the depen-
dent variable, producing coefﬁcients ˜ ak. Because by assumption there can be no causal effect of
entry in the period before it occurs, the terms ˜ ak for k < 0 can only be nonzero if l 6= 0, i.e., if
state variable z which evolves as a random walk. As expected, the state variable increases signiﬁcantly in expectation
in periods before an entry (and decreases in periods before an exit). For many parameter values, the coefﬁcient on the
lagged value is almost as high as the coefﬁcient on the “on-impact” effect.
3We do this by constructing a regression prediction of each variable using ten lags of the variable and ten lags of
our main event indicator Dnct. We then construct a “whitened” series of innovations by extracting residuals from the
predictive regression. By construction, these residuals are orthogonal to past realizations of the variable and of the
event indicator.
17newspaper proﬁtability affects the outcome variable. Moreover, the sign of ˜ ak for k < 0 will be
identical to that of l, and if, for example, a1 is close in magnitude to a0 in equation (3), then ˜ a1
will approximate the bias in our estimate of b.4
To summarize, we expect that if unobserved shocks to newspaper proﬁts affect political out-
comes (or are driven by the same factors) we will observe that current changes in the newspaper
market are correlated with past changes in political outcomes. This will be true if the shocks in
question are i.i.d. across time, and even more so if they are serially correlated.5 By contrast, if
newspapers exert a causal effect on political outcomes but newspaper proﬁtability does not, current
changes in the newspaper market will be unrelated to past changes in political outcomes.
5 Effect of Newspapers on Political Participation
5.1 Speciﬁcation, Mechanisms, and Potential Confounds
In this section, we deﬁne yct to be turnout (the ratio of votes cast to the number of eligible voters)
in presidential and congressional elections.
In our main speciﬁcations, the independent variable is the number of newspapers nct. When
we study competition in table 5, we deﬁne a vector of indicators for whether county c (i) has  1
newspaper, (ii) has  2 newspapers, and (iii) has  3 newspapers. When we look at ideological
diversity in the ﬁnal speciﬁcation in table 5, we include these three components plus an indicator
for whether or not the county has at least one Democratic and one Republican newspaper. We
4Consider our simple special case in which zct is a random walk and there is at most one entry. Ignore state-year
ﬁxed effects and other controls, and assume that absent entry both proﬁts and the outcome of interest have no drift, and









= la 1. The naive estimate of the causal effect b has a bias that approaches the lead effect
˜ a 1 as a0 approaches a 1. If we can use an observable proxy for proﬁts such as population to estimate the ratio
a0=a 1 (how much faster proﬁts grow in the period of an entry relative to the period before), we can estimate the size
of the bias directly from the pre-trends in the outcome variable and adjust the naive estimate of b. We implement an
approach in this spirit in appendix C and show that our results are similar to our main speciﬁcations.
5Note that our random-walk model assumes that shocks to proﬁts are permanent, an assumption motivated by
the empirical time-series properties of key drivers of proﬁtability such as population. Increases in proﬁtability that
dissipate within 4 years would not usually be enough to induce a forward-looking newspaper to enter, but if they were
large they might. In such a case, absent a causal effect of newspapers (i.e. if b = 0), we would expect ˜ a0and ˜ a1 to
have opposite signs, because the trends that induce entry would reverse in the following period. This pattern would be
a confound in models that estimate a temporary effect of newspapers on political outcomes, rather than the permanent
effects we estimate, and in any case is not present in our data. Therefore in order to mimic the patterns we will attribute
to a causal effect of newspapers, transitory shocks to newspaper proﬁtability would have to induce permanent changes
in political outcomes. We consider such cases to be unlikely a priori. In addition, shocks to newspaper circulation
exhibit a high degree of persistence, so it is unlikely that transitory shocks account for a large fraction of the events
that we exploit in estimation.
18estimate all models in ﬁrst differences.
The most obvious mechanism linking newspapers and voter turnout is information. Newspa-
pers may simply inform (or remind) people of the fact that an election is taking place. Newspapers
also provide information about the issues at stake and the candidates’ characteristics and platforms.
Most theories of voting predict that individuals will be more likely to vote when they are better in-
formed (Feddersen 2004), and existing evidence supports this prediction (Matsusaka 1995; Lassen
2005). Newspapers could also affect turnout as a byproduct of increasing social capital and general
civic engagement (Putnam 2000), or because partisan papers intentionally mobilize their party’s
supporters to vote.
Several distinct intuitions suggest these effects may vary with the extent of newspaper compe-
tition. On the one hand, second and later entrants to a market may have smaller effects than ﬁrst
entrants because some of their readership comes from customers of the incumbent paper(s) and so
they increase the share of people reading at least one newspaper by less. On the other hand, later
entrants may have larger effects, or at least larger effects than a naive model would predict, because
they expand the market by driving down prices and driving up quality, prevent capture by interests
opposed to a broad franchise, or make government more responsive to constituent interests and so
increase the motivation to vote.
There are also a variety of reasons to expect turnout effects to change over time. One of
the most important is the availability of substitute news sources. As we argue in section 3, the
introduction of radio and television reduced the importance of newspapers as a source of election
news, especially in the case of presidential contests.
Turning to potential sources of bias in our estimates, recall from the discussion above that
the most important drivers of newspaper entry and exit are likely to be population and income.
If anything, these factors are likely to bias us against ﬁnding positive effects of newspapers on
turnout.
Population growth typically decreases voter turnout. Geys (2006), for example, draws this
conclusion from a meta-analysis of aggregate studies of voter turnout. A natural explanation is that
movers—bothnewcomerstoanareaandthosewhoaremostlikelytoleave—arelessrootedintheir
community and consequently less likely to vote. Because newspapers enter growing markets, we
would expect these forces to exert a downward bias on our estimates of the effect of newspapers on
turnout. Indeed, as we show below, entries are associated with downward trends in turnout, which
are largely attributable to demographic changes associated with population growth.
The effects of income growth on voter turnout are less clear. Theoretically, higher income
19could increase turnout (if the poor feel disenfranchised) or decrease turnout (if higher income in-
creases the value of time). Empirical results vary, with many studies ﬁnding no consistent evidence
of an effect in either direction. Blais’ (2006) review of cross-national/time-series evidence con-
cludes that “there is no clear relationship between the economic conjuncture and turnout.” Charles
and Stephens (2009) ﬁnd a statistically robust negative effect of local economic performance on
turnout. We therefore expect the magnitude of any bias from unmeasured income shocks to be
small and most likely negative. Consistent with this expectation, we ﬁnd in unreported regressions
that the growth rate of manufacturing output per capita is, if anything, slightly negatively related
to changes in voter turnout, an effect that is largely eliminated when we control for population
growth.
An important remaining question is to what extent political drivers of turnout, such as the
closeness of elections, would also affect newspaper proﬁts. Although such effects are possible,
our reading of the historical literature is that political factors are likely to be small relative to
commercial considerations. Consistent with this prior, we ﬁnd that the competitiveness of the
presidential election at the state level, which is plausibly exogenous to any given county’s news
market, has a large effect on county-level turnout, but no discernible effect on the timing of entries
and exits.
5.2 Main Results
Figure 4 illustrates how readership evolves around the entry of a newspaper. The ﬁgure plots
estimates of the coefﬁcients ˜ ak from a speciﬁcation analogous to equation 3 where the dependent
variable is readership per eligible voter. The ﬁgure illustrates three points. First, the entry of a
newspaperisassociatedwithalargeincreaseinreadershipofaround13percentagepoints. Second,
most of the effect of the entry of a newspaper on readership occurs on impact: dynamics after the
event are small relative to the contemporaneous effect of the event. Third, there is no evidence of
positive trends in per capita demand for newspapers prior to the entry of a new paper. If anything,
readership per eligible voter declines prior to entry. Note that, because of growth in the voting-
eligible population, total readership—as opposed to readership per capita—does increase before
the entry of a newspaper. The fact that the only signiﬁcant trends in circulation prior to entry are
attributable to market scale supports our earlier claim that population and income are the main
drivers of entries and exits, and that other factors such as interest in politics likely play a much
smaller role.
20Figure 5 presents our core result on the effect of entries and exits on turnout visually.6 The
ﬁgure plots estimates of the coefﬁcients ˜ ak from a speciﬁcation analogous to equation 3 where
the dependent variable is the change in presidential turnout per eligible voter. The prediction that
newspaper entry increases voter turnout (and that newspaper exit decreases it) corresponds to a
positive spike in the plot at k = 0. Because the plots are in changes rather than levels, a single
positive spike corresponds to a permanent positive effect on the level of turnout.
Panel A shows the estimated effects of entries and exits when we include no controls other
than state-year ﬁxed effects. The solid line in the ﬁgure plots the corresponding trends in turnout
as predicted from demographics Dxct. The ﬁgure clearly shows a positive on-impact effect of
events, with an entry corresponding to an increase in turnout of roughly 0:2 percentage points.
Consistent with our expectation that rising population will be associated with falling turnout, the
plot shows a signiﬁcant negative pre-trend, with turnout declining on average in the ﬁve periods
preceding an entry. This trend is reasonably well-approximated by demographics, suggesting that
the ﬁgure understates the true causal effect of entries.
Panel B shows the estimate effects when we control explicitly for demographics. With these
controls, there are no signiﬁcant trends before or after events, and the estimate on-impact coefﬁ-
cient increases to roughly 0:3 percentage points.
Table 3 presents regression estimates of b from equation 1. All models include state-year ﬁxed
effects. In column (1), the dependent variable yct is newspaper readership per eligible voter. The
positive sign of this coefﬁcient is essentially mechanical, but its magnitude is informative about
the average size of our events. The results show that the average event changes the share of eligible
voters reading at least one newspaper by approximately 13 percentage points. In columns (2) and
(3), the dependent variable is presidential turnout. These estimates represent the same information
presented in ﬁgure 5. With no controls, we estimate that the average event increases turnout by
0:26 percentage points. As we would expect based on ﬁgure 5, including controls increases the
coefﬁcient to 0:34 percentage points.
Column (4) presents results for congressional turnout in presidential election years. Column
(5) presents results for congressional turnout in off-year elections. In both cases the results are
similar to results for presidential elections.
6Because we cannot identify events prior to the 1868-1872 period, some lag terms Dnc(t+k)for k < 0 are unknown
in years prior to 1912. We code these as having a value of 0, though the value at which we impute them does not matter
because our models include state-year ﬁxed effects. The pattern of coefﬁcients bk for k  0 is essentially unchanged
when we exclude these unknown terms, and is extremely similar when we include data on changes in turnout prior to
1868 in the model.
215.3 Robustness
We have argued that mismeasurement of the trends in population and income that drive most en-
tries and exits would likely lead us to underestimate the effect of newspapers on turnout. Table
4 provides a check on this claim by separately estimating the effect of political and non-political
newspapers. Non-political newspapers likely respond to the same economic forces as political
newspapers, but are far less likely to affect turnout. Column (1) shows that, as expected, en-
tries of both types of newspapers are associated with positive (and statistically indistinguishable)
trends in population. Column (2) shows that only political newspapers affect turnout: the effect of
non-political newspapers on turnout is negative, statistically insigniﬁcant, and statistically distin-
guishable from that of political newspapers at the 10 percent level.
We have also argued that our estimates are not likely to be biased by trends in interest in
politics correlated with the entries of newspapers. As a test of this claim we have estimated the
effect of an entry on the turnout in counties elsewhere in the same state. Counties in the same state
exhibit highly correlated trends in turnout, likely due to institutional factors such as the Electoral
College. However, these counties have relatively distinct news markets, though we caution that
some spillover in circulation is likely present in most cases. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd a small and
statisticallyinsigniﬁcantpositiverelationshipbetweenentryofnewspapersinacountyandchanges
in turnout in other counties in the same state.
In appendix C, we show that our estimates of turnout effects are robust across a range of
alternative speciﬁcations. The estimates are larger for events involving large papers than for events
involving small papers, larger when we focus on the sub-sample of isolated counties that only
contain a single city (where our market deﬁnition is likely to be most accurate), and larger when
we truncate Dnct to vary between  1 and 1. They are similar when we estimate the cumulative
effect over the period of the event and one subsequent period, suggesting that most of the effect
we measure happens “on impact.” Estimates are robust to allowing ﬂexible polynomial trends in
outcome variables around events, as well as allowing restricted trends whose time path is based on
the relationship between observed state variables and entry and exit.
We have also explored the heterogeneity in the effect of newspapers on turnout. First, we
have estimated speciﬁcations that allow increases and decreases in the number of newspapers to
affect turnout differently, but ﬁnd no evidence of such an asymmetry. Second, we have estimated
models allowing afﬁliated and unafﬁliated newspapers to affect turnout differently, and again ﬁnd
no evidence of heterogeneous effects.
225.4 Interaction with Market Structure
Table 5 shows how our estimated effects vary with the extent of market competition and ideological
diversity. The model in columns (1) and (2) is identical to the one in the previous table, except
that the independent variables of interest are a set of indicators for the number of newspapers in
the county. These interactions are identiﬁed by variation in the effect of entries/exits on turnout
according to the number of newspapers in the county at time t  1. If there are no other sources
of heterogeneity in the effect of newspaper entries/exits that are correlated with the number of
newspapers prior to the event, then (under our other maintained assumptions) these parameters can
be taken as causal estimates of the effect of the number of competing newspapers on voter turnout.
Column (1) shows the effect on readership. The entry or exit of a county’s ﬁrst newspaper
changes the share of eligible voters reading at least one newspaper by 25 percentage points on
average. The effect for second and third newspapers is signiﬁcantly smaller, both because the
circulation of these papers is typically lower and because some individuals who read a second or
third paper already read the ﬁrst.
Column (2) shows the effect on turnout. The entry or exit of the ﬁrst paper has a signiﬁcant
positive effect of 1:0 percentage point. Subsequent entries have smaller effects that are not consis-
tently signiﬁcantly different from zero. We can reject the null hypothesis that the marginal effect
of second and subsequent newspapers are as large as the marginal effect of the ﬁrst. The relative
magnitudes of the 3 and 1 newspaper coefﬁcients is reasonably close to what we would expect
based on column (1) if the effects were proportional to the increase in readership, while the  2
newspaper coefﬁcient is smaller than we would expect.
Column (3) tests the hypothesis that ideological diversity promotes political participation. In
addition to the interactions with number of newspapers in the market, we include an indicator
for whether the county has at least one Republican and one Democratic newspaper. To facilitate
interpretation, we restrict analysis to counties with no unafﬁliated newspapers. We cannot reject
the null hypothesis that there is no additional effect of ideological diversity.
5.5 Changes over Time
Table 6 shows how our estimated effects change over time. We estimate a single regression with
separate effects for events in each of our three time periods. Of course many things are changing
over time, and we cannot attribute differences across these periods deﬁnitively to the effects of
radio and television per se.
23Column (1) of table 6 shows that the effect of entries and exits on readership grows larger over
time, reﬂecting the larger circulation of entering and exiting papers in later years.
Column (2) presents results on presidential turnout. As predicted, the results are strongest in
the period before radio or television, with the average event increasing turnout by 0:8 percentage
points.7 The point estimate for the radio period is smaller and marginally statistically signiﬁcant.
The coefﬁcient in the television period is almost exactly zero. We can reject the equality of the
coefﬁcients across the three periods at the 10 percent level.
Columns (3) and (4) show how the changes over time differ for congressional turnout. The
precision of these estimates does not permit us to make strong statements about the relative magni-
tudes, but the results are consistent with newspapers in the television era being more important for
congressional elections than for presidential elections. The point estimate for the effect of entries
and exits on congressional turnout in the television period is larger than for presidential turnout
(and marginally signiﬁcantly different from zero in off-year elections, though not in presidential
years). We cannot rule out that the effect of newspapers on congressional turnout is constant over
these three periods.
5.6 Discussion of Magnitudes
Our estimates suggest that introducing a newspaper to a county without one raises presidential
turnout per eligible voter by about 1:0 percentage point. It raises the share of individuals reading
at least one newspaper by 25 percentage points. Following the logic of Gerber and Green’s (2000)
intent-to-treat calculation, our point estimate corresponds to a 1:0=25=4:0 percentage point effect
of reading the newspaper on the probability of voting.
Wecanalsotranslateourestimatesintoa“persuasionrate”(DellaVignaandKaplan2007)—the
number of eligible voters who changed their voting behavior as a result of the introduction of the
newspaper, as a fraction of all those who could have changed their behavior. To do this, we assume:
(i) the effect of the introduction of the newspaper on the likelihood of voting is non-negative for
all eligible voters and (ii) voters and non-voters are equally likely to read the newspaper. In the
average county-year for counties with no newspaper, 69 percent of eligible voters vote, so by
7The estimate for the newspaper period in table 6 is slightly smaller than the analogous estimate from table 5.
Following the criteria in section 2.4, the sample in table 5 includes the set of counties that experience at least one
four-year period in which the number of newspapers increases or decreases during the newspaper period (1868-1928).
The sample in table 6 includes the set of counties that experience at least one such change during the entire period
(1868-2004). The latter is by construction a broader set of counties. Deﬁning the sample in this way allows us to
estimate our model for a consistent set of counties over time, but results in a slightly smaller estimate of the effect of
newspapers on turnout during the newspaper period.
24assumption (i) only 31 percent of eligible voters could have their behavior altered by the entry of
a newspaper. Then by assumption (ii), among those who would not otherwise vote, 25 percent
read the newspaper, representing 7:7 percent of eligible voters. The 1:0 percent of eligible voters
who vote as a result of the introduction of the newspaper therefore imply a persuasion rate of
1:0=7:7 = 12:8 percent.
Both the intent-to-treat and persuasion rate estimates would increase if fewer than 2 eligible
voters read each newspaper circulated, as seems plausible given the documented over-reporting of
news consumption in survey data (Prior 2009).
For comparison, DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2009) summarize effect sizes and persuasion rates
for a number of recent randomized get-out-the-vote experiments. The persuasion rates range from
a low of 1 percent (ITT = 0:6 percentage points) for direct-mail solicitations in Gerber and Green
(2000), to highs of 16 percent (ITT =8:6 percentage points) and 21 percent (ITT =6:9 percentage
points) for face-to-face and by-phone solicitations in Gerber and Green (2000) and Gerber and
Green (2001) respectively.
Our estimates lie toward the low end of the spectrum of recent estimates by economists of the
effect of media on voter turnout. Strömberg (2004) ﬁnds that increasing the share of households
with radios from 0 to 1 increased turnout in gubernatorial races by 7 percentage points in the 1920-
1940 period. Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel (forthcoming) ﬁnd that the introduction of Spanish-
language local television increases turnout among Hispanics in a metro area by 5-10 percentage
points.
Gentzkow (2006) ﬁnds that the introduction of television in the 1940s and 1950s reduced
turnout, and hypothesizes crowding out of newspapers and radio as a possible mechanism. The es-
timated cumulative effect of television on turnout over 10 years is equal to 2 percentage points for
congressional elections and 0.7 percentage points for presidential elections (with the latter effect
not signiﬁcantly different from zero). Gentzkow (2006) estimates that the introduction of televi-
sion reduced the likelihood of getting campaign information from a newspaper by 11.4 percentage
points. Applying our intent-to-treat estimates, this would imply a reduction in voter turnout of
about (11:4)(0:04) = 0:5 percentage points, or one-quarter of the estimated effect of television,
with the rest attributable to crowd-out of radio or other mechanisms.
As another benchmark, Gomez, Hansford and Krause (2007) ﬁnd that rain on election day
reduces turnout by about 0:12 percentage points on average. (The average rainy election day has
0:14 inches greater than the normal amount of rain for the county, and the effect of rain on turnout
is 0:89 percentage points per inch.) Thus, the effect of a monopoly newspaper closing is about 8
25times larger than an average rainy election day.
Finally, we note that the effect of introducing a newspaper to a county without one is 8 percent
of the standard deviation of the change in voter turnout between presidential elections, and 12
percent of the root mean squared error of our model.
6 Effect of Newspapers on Party Vote Shares
6.1 Speciﬁcation, Mechanisms, and Potential Confounds
In this section, we deﬁne yct to be the share of the presidential or congressional two-party vote won
by Republicans.
We deﬁne the main independent variable to be the change in the difference (#Rep #Dem),
where #Rep is the number of Republican papers in the market and #Dem is the number of Demo-
cratic papers.8 When we study competition in table 8, we interact this measure with indicators for
the number of newspapers, and include main effects of those indicators as controls. We estimate
all models in ﬁrst differences.
The literature suggests several mechanisms by which partisan newspapers may shift vote shares
in favor of their preferred candidates. Even if voters are rational, papers may ﬁlter or slant infor-
mation so as to systematically persuade voters to shift their allegiances (Kamenica and Gentzkow
2009). If voters underestimate the bias of outlets (Eyster and Rabin 2009), make errors in updating
their beliefs (Mullainathan, Schwartzstein, and Shleifer 2008), or are subject to other non-rational
forms of persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo 1996), the scope for media inﬂuence will be even greater.
A substantial literature in political science adds the further observation that even if media do not
change voters’ views on particular issues, they may still inﬂuence their votes by determining which
issues are most salient—i.e., by determining the political “agenda” (McCombs and Shaw 1972).
Finally, partisan media may inﬂuence vote shares as a by-product of the turnout effects demon-
strated in the last section. Since partisan papers are read most by those who start out sharing the
papers’ views (Gentzkow and Shapiro forthcoming), turnout effects on readers could also shift
party vote shares.
Although the basic intuition that Republican papers should increase Republican vote shares
seems transparent, theory suggests an important subtlety in a world where newspapers choose
their party afﬁliations endogenously. Consider a simple model where voters are distributed on a
8This speciﬁcation restricts the effect of Republican and Democratic newspapers to be equal and opposite. We
have tested that restriction and ﬁnd that we cannot reject it.
26continuum from conservative to liberal, each newspaper also has a location on this continuum, and
the effect of newspapers is to pull voters closer to their own location. If newspaper locations were
assigned randomly, we would expect the entry of a right-wing monopolist to shift voters to the
right on average. If newspapers choose their locations to maximize proﬁts, however, a right-wing
monopolist is probably coming into a market where the median voter is already right-wing. Such
an entry might have little or no effect on vote shares. In this view, we might predict signiﬁcantly
larger effects for duopoly papers, since they are more likely to be located away from the median
voter.
The endogenous positioning of newspapers is also the most obvious confound to our estimation
strategy. All else equal, a market where a Republican paper enters (or a Democratic paper exits)
is likely to be a place where voters are becoming more Republican for reasons that have nothing
to do with newspapers. This suggests that, if anything, l > 0, resulting in a positive bias in our
estimate of b. If anything, then, our estimates will overstate the persuasive effects of newspapers.
6.2 Main Results
Figure 6 shows the effect of the entry and exit of partisan papers on the Republican share of
circulation. The ﬁgure plots estimates of the coefﬁcients ˜ ak from a speciﬁcation analogous to
equation 3 where the dependent variable is the change in the difference in the Republican and
Democrat shares of county circulation. The independent variable is the change in the difference
between the number of Republican and Democratic afﬁliated newspapers. The magnitudes in the
ﬁgure can therefore be interpreted to mean that removing a Democratic newspaper and replacing
it with a Republican one increases the fraction of circulation to Republican relative to Democratic
papers by 50 percentage points. Though not visible due to the scale of the axes, the entry of a
Republican paper is preceded by a slight increase in Republican circulation, as a simple model
of entry would predict. But these trends are tiny by comparison with the on-impact effect of a
newspaper entering the market.
Figure 7 shows the effect of entry and exit of partisan papers on party vote shares visually. The
ﬁgure plots estimates of the coefﬁcients ˜ ak from a speciﬁcation analogous to equation 3 where the
dependent variable is the change in the share of votes going to Republicans. The prediction that
having a Republican newspaper shifts votes to Republicans corresponds to a positive spike in the
plot at k = 0.
Panel A shows the estimated effects when we include no controls. The solid line in the ﬁgure
plots the corresponding trends in turnout predicted from state-year ﬁxed effects Dgst. The ﬁgure
27shows no evidence of an on-impact effect of events. Consistent with what we would expect, there
is a broad positive trend associated with net entry of Republican papers. The majority of estimated
coefﬁcients are above the line, suggesting that Republican papers tend to enter markets where
the Republican vote share is growing. However, the estimated effect in the year of the event is not
signiﬁcantly different from zero and is no larger in magnitude than the estimated effect two periods
prior to or after the event.
Panel B shows that when we control for state-year ﬁxed effects the positive trends in Re-
publican vote share around the net entry of a Republican paper essentially vanish. There is no
distinguishable on-impact effect of entry on vote shares.
Table 7 presents our main results. Column (1) presents the coefﬁcient from a speciﬁcation
where the dependent variable is the difference between the share of circulation going to Republican
papers and the share going to Democratic papers. This is one measure of the magnitude of the
effect of an average event on the distribution of content that voters are actually reading. If all
events were monopoly entries or exits and all newspapers were afﬁliated with a party, the value of
this coefﬁcient would be one mechanically. The estimated coefﬁcient shows that the average event
shifts the balance of readership by 51 percentage points.
Columns (2) and (3) show the effects of partisan papers on presidential vote shares. The co-
efﬁcients are almost exactly zero, with conﬁdence intervals that rule out positive effects greater
than about 0:2 percentage points. The coefﬁcient is unaffected by the inclusion of demographic
controls.
Column (4) shows the estimated effect on congressional vote share. Here, the point estimate is
slightly positive, but still far from statistical signiﬁcance. The standard errors are larger here, and
we are able to rule out positive effects greater than 0:6 percentage points.
In appendix C, we show that our ﬁnding of no statistically signiﬁcant vote share effects is
robust across a range of alternative speciﬁcations.
6.3 Interaction with Market Structure and Changes over Time
Table 8 shows how the effect of newspapers on party vote shares varies with market competition.
Column (1) shows that as predicted, the effect of entries and exits on the balance of readership
interacts strongly with the number of papers. Monopoly entries shift the readership share by ap-
proximately one. Second newspapers shift it by about 46 percentage points and third and later
entrants by about 27 percentage points.
Columns (2) and (3) present effects on presidential and congressional vote shares respectively.
28In no case do we detect a signiﬁcant effect of events. If anything, the coefﬁcient on duopoly
papers tends to be larger than the coefﬁcient on monopoly papers, possibly reﬂecting the role of
endogenous positioning. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that all the coefﬁcients are
equal to zero, either individually or jointly.
Our ability to study changes over time in persuasive effects is more limited than for turnout
effects because partisan afﬁliation is less common in later years of our sample. That said, we
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effects in the newspaper, radio, or television periods. We omit these results for
brevity.
6.4 Discussion of Magnitudes
To get a sense of the size of the persuasive effects our estimates rule out, consider a county with a
single Democratic newspaper. Changing the local newspaper to be Republican (which would in-
crease the share of mentions devoted to Republican candidates by 18 percentage points) represents
a change of 2 units (from  1 to 1) in the independent variable. We can therefore rule out an effect
of this change on the Republican share of the two-party vote of about 0:4 percentage points. Fol-
lowing our calculations in section 5, this corresponds to an intent-to-treat effect of 0:4=0:25 = 1:7
percentage points. In an otherwise evenly split county, this corresponds to a persuasion rate of
about 3:4 percent provided that the newspaper is equally likely to be read by voters of both parties.
(The persuasion rate would be smaller under the more realistic assumption that Republicans are
more likely to read the Republican paper.)
For comparison, DellaVigna and Kaplan’s (2007) estimate of the effect of Fox News on the Re-
publican presidentialvote shareimplies apersuasion rate of11:6 percent. Enikolopov, Petrova, and
Zhuravskaya (2009) estimate effects of an independent anti-Putin broadcaster in Russia on Putin’s
party’s vote, ﬁnding a persuasion rate of 10:2 percent. Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan (2009) ﬁnd that
randomly assigned subscriptions to the Washington Post decreased the Republican gubernatorial
vote share in Virginia by 11:2 percentage points; this implies a persuasion rate of about 20 percent
if we assume all individuals who were given subscriptions read the paper. Our conﬁdence interval
thus easily rules out the hypothesis that the entry or exit of an average monopoly newspaper has
effects of the same size as any of these experiments.
As another benchmark, Gomez, Hansford and Krause (2007) estimate that a typical rainy day
increases the Republican vote share by 0:33 percentage points. (They ﬁnd that an inch of rain
above normal in a county raises the Republican share of the vote by 2:4 percentage points and
that a typical rainy day has about 0:14 inches of rain more than normal.) The upper end of our
29conﬁdence interval thus corresponds to an effect 1:3 times as large as an average day of rain.
As a ﬁnal comparison, we ﬁnd that the upper bound of our conﬁdence interval corresponds to 2
percent of the standard deviation of the change in the Republican share of the two-party vote, and
3 percent of the root mean squared error of our model.
A separate question is whether our null estimates in this section are consistent with the signif-
icant turnout effects we estimate in section 5. As discussed above, if readers differentially prefer
newspapers whose afﬁliation matches their own ideology, a positive turnout effect by itself implies
we should see some effect on vote shares. To get a sense of the magnitude of the vote share effect
we would expect based on our turnout estimates, consider the entry of a monopoly Republican pa-
per to a 50 percent Republican market and make the following assumptions: (i) newspapers cannot
change the share of Republicans in the population; (ii) in the absence of newspapers, turnout is
identical for Republicans and Democrats; (iii) newspapers increase turnout of all readers by the




where g is the effect of reading a newspaper on turnout, cR and cD are the readership rates of
Republicans and Democrats respectively, and t is the post-entry turnout rate for the population as
a whole. Given our intent-to-treat estimate of g = 0:040 (section 5.6) on turnout, overall average
turnout in markets with no newspaper oft =0:69, and average readership share of 25 percent (table
5, column 1), Republicans would need to be 4 times more likely to read the paper than Democrats
to generate a vote share effect of 0:4 percentage points. Our vote share and turnout estimates are
therefore consistent for even large differences in the propensity to read.
7 Effect of Newspapers on Incumbency Advantage
In this section, we deﬁne yct to be the either the share of the congressional two-party vote won
by the incumbent candidate or an indicator for whether the congressional incumbent is running
unopposed. We exclude cases in which the incumbent in the current or previous election is either
not running or is not from one of the two main parties, or in which the state was redistricted
between the current and previous election. We conduct the analysis at the level of the congressional
district. Our independent variables are deﬁned as in section 5, and we estimate all models in ﬁrst
differences.
30A particular media outlet could either increase or decrease the vote share of incumbents, de-
pending on how it compares to alternative communication channels. If voters are rational, intro-
ducing more accurate information about the performance of incumbents will tend to help good
incumbents and harm bad incumbents, and need have no clear effect on average (Gordon and
Landa 2009).
Newspapers could increase incumbency advantage if they make winning an earlier election a
more informative signal of quality (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2008) or if they increase
non-informational advantages of incumbency such as name recognition (Ansolabehere, Snowberg
and Snyder 2006; Prior 2006).
Newspapers could decrease incumbency advantage if incumbents control alternative means of
reaching voters. Moreover, if incumbents have a differential ability to bribe or otherwise “capture”
information outlets, making media markets more competitive will tend to limit their inﬂuence
(Besley and Prat 2006). Such theories are ambiguous about the inﬂuence of a ﬁrst newspaper (at
least in a world with no television or radio), but predict strong effects of second and later entrants.
The link between media and incumbency is made more complicated by the possibility that
both challengers and incumbents respond endogenously to changes in the media market. If the
media makes communication by challengers easier, for example, challengers may be more likely
to contest races in the ﬁrst place. The quality of candidates who choose to enter may also be
higher. These responses would serve as a “multiplier” to the baseline effect of media. On the other
hand, incumbents might respond to media scrutiny by reducing corruption or exerting more effort
in satisfying constituent interests. This would be an important positive effect of the media that we
would not measure. It would also tend to reduce the size of the effects we would see on incumbent
vote shares.
Potential bias in our incumbency estimates would require that newspaper entries and exits are
correlated with drivers of party vote shares in a way that differs depending on the party afﬁliation
of the incumbent. So long as newspapers mainly respond to economic forces, the scope for such
bias seems limited. Bias could be introduced if incumbents themselves fund newspaper entries and
are systematically more likely to do so when their support is either growing or shrinking. At least
some contemporary evidence (Gentzkow and Shapiro forthcoming) casts doubt on incumbents’
inﬂuence on news content. While we cannot rule out such confounds, we expect their effect on our
estimates to be limited.
Table 9 presents our main results in this section, showing the effect of newspaper competition
on our measures of incumbency advantage. Our point estimates generally indicate that additional
31newspapers reduce the incumbent’s vote share and the likelihood that the incumbent runs unop-
posed. The estimates are statistically insigniﬁcant.
At the point estimates, having a newspaper reduces the incumbency advantage by about 1:7
percentage points. For comparison, the much-discussed increase in the incumbency advantage
in the post-WWII United States took the incumbency advantage from 2 percentage points in the
1940s to 8 percentage points in the 1990s (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2002). Snyder and Stromberg
(2008) ﬁnd that greater press coverage increases the incumbency advantage by about 1 percentage
point. Prior (2006) argues that the diffusion of television increased the incumbency advantage by
about 2-3 percentage points, although Ansolabehere, Snowberg and Snyder (2006) use a different
methodology and ﬁnd that television had no effect.
In unreported speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant evidence of incumbency effects
when we aggregate all changes in the number of newspapers (rather than breaking these out ac-
cording to the degree of competition in the market), and no evidence of variation in the incumbency
effects of newspapers over time. The absence of a clear incumbency effect is robust across a range
of alternative speciﬁcations analogous to those in appendix C.
8 Conclusions
Policy has long been built on assumptions about the way media markets inﬂuence politics. We
introduce a new dataset on the history of US newspapers and use it to test the inﬂuence of media
in three channels. First, we show that newspapers have a robust positive effect on political partic-
ipation. We estimate that one additional newspaper increases both presidential and congressional
turnout by approximately 0:3 percentage points. The effect on presidential turnout diminishes af-
ter the introduction of radio and television, while the estimated effect on congressional turnout
remains similar up to recent years. Newspaper competition is not a key driver of turnout: our
effect is explained mainly by the ﬁrst newspaper in a market, and the effect of a second or third
paper is signiﬁcantly smaller. Second, we show that the persuasive impact of partisan newspapers
is limited. We ﬁnd no evidence that these papers sway large numbers of voters to support one party
or the other, with conﬁdence intervals that rule out even moderate-sized effects. Finally, we ﬁnd
no clear evidence that newspapers systematically help or hurt incumbents.
These results are consistent with a model in which newspapers affect the political process
mainly by providing information. In a market with no newspapers and no alternative media
sources, turnout is depressed because voters have limited information about issues, candidates,
32and elections. The ﬁrst newspaper has a large effect on turnout because it has a large effect on in-
formation. Second and third newspapers have smaller effects, and newspapers in the television and
radio periods are relatively less important for national elections that these alternative media cover
heavily. Our ﬁnding of limited persuasive effects is consistent with consumers ﬁltering partisan in-
formation when it is clearly labeled as such, and also with newspapers choosing their afﬁliations to
match consumers existing beliefs. That newspapers do not systematically help or hurt incumbents
is consistent with informational theories of incumbency advantage.
All of our results concern average effects over a large sample of years, markets, and events.
They do not rule out the possibility that particular papers had effects that were either larger or
smaller than what we estimate. This is an important caveat to keep in mind when comparing our
estimates to those in the literature and when applying lessons from this study to policy.
A second important caveat is that none of our electoral outcomes can be interpreted as unam-
biguously increasing or decreasing welfare. Measures such as turnout and incumbency advantage
are extensively studied empirically and are often taken as measures of the performance of political
markets. But theoretically they need not be positively related to welfare in all cases. A useful next
step would therefore be to connect the changes in media markets that we exploit to more concrete
measures of public policy and of the performance of public ofﬁcials.
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38Appendices
A Construction of US Newspaper Panel
Data for 1869 through 1876 are from G. Rowell & Co’s American Newspaper Directory (“Row-
ell’s”). Data for 1880 through 1928 are from N. W. Ayer & Son’s American Newspaper Annual
(“Ayer’s”). Data for 1932 through 2004 are from Editor & Publisher Yearbook (“E&P”). We
scanned the volumes for 1869 and each presidential election year thereafter to pdf, and had them
converted to machine-readable text by a data entry ﬁrm. For Rowell’s and Ayer’s (where the text
is of poorer quality) the ﬁrm keyed each record twice independently and reconciled discrepancies.
We used audits and automated scripts to detect and correct remaining errors.
These sources are considered authoritative and are often used in historical research. To evaluate
their coverage we measured mutual consistency in 1932, where we have data from both E&P and
Ayer’s. Only 1.3% of E&P papers could not be found in the Ayer’s directory, and only 1.6% of the
Ayer’s papers could not be found in E&P.
A data entry ﬁrm entered data from the directories on all daily newspapers. For the Rowell’s
and Ayer’s directories, some judgment is required in deciding which newspapers are dailies. To
checkthequalityofthesejudgments, weexaminedatafortheyears1908-1928, inwhichtheAyer’s
directories are supplemented with a separate (and separately keyed) listing of all daily newspapers
(the “Daily Lists”). Of newspapers listed in the Daily Lists, 0:09 percent were not found in the data
entered from the Ayer’s directories. Of newspapers listed in the Ayer’s directories, 1.76% were not
found in the Daily Lists. (Most of these were daily student newspapers which were excluded from
the Daily Lists because they do not publish year-round.)
We conducted random audits of the quality of the data keyed by the data entry ﬁrm for the
Rowell’s and Ayer’s directories. We estimate that the error rate in keying is less than 1 in 5000
characters. When possible we identiﬁed and corrected typos in the course of producing data for
analysis.
Our dataset includes English-language daily newspapers. We consider a newspaper to be a
daily if it circulates at least 4 or more weekdays each week. In cases where newspapers published
multiple editions, typically both a morning and evening edition, we treat those as separate records.
We exclude foreign-language newspapers, national newspapers (the Christian Science Monitor,
Wall Street Journal and USA Today), and some clearly non-news publications (e.g., real estate
listings, live stock listings, etc.) from the sample.
39We extract data on daily (weekday) circulation of newspapers. Some records report circulation
values from multiple sources. Whenever possible, we use ﬁgures provided by the Audit Bureau
of Circulations. We employ a consistent hierarchy of sources when such a ﬁgure is not available.
We identiﬁed cases with unusual changes in circulation as likely errors and corrected any incorrect
values.
We use an automated script (supplemented with manual corrections) to match newspapers
across years on the basis of their title, city, and time of day. The script allows for some inex-
act matches and tries to identify cases in which multiple newspapers merge to form a new paper.
We use this matching to construct a time-constant classiﬁcation of political afﬁliation for the news-
papers in our sample, as described in section 2.
The directories associate each newspaper with a city. We use an automated script (supple-
mented with manual corrections) to match listed city names to Census-deﬁned places. We use the
1990 Geographic Identiﬁcation Code Scheme (GICS) data from the US Census Bureau to match
Census places to counties. In cases where there were multiple counties assigned to a place, we
chose the county that was home to the highest proportion of the place’s population.
This approach assumes that county boundaries are constant over time, when in fact they do
sometimes change. Data from ICPSR Study 6576 show that 21 percent of the counties in our data
experienced a border change between 1870 and 1960. In an audit of city-county matches in 1900,
using a 1900 atlas of U.S. counties, we ﬁnd that cities were incorrectly assigned in 0:98 percent of
cases.
B Sources of Voting Data
Our primary source for county-level voting data is a set of data ﬁles generously provided by James
Snyder, which in turn are based on ICPSR Study 8611, Congressional Quarterly, and other public
sources. From these ﬁles we obtain vote totals by party and year at the county level for presidential,
congressional, senate, and gubernatorial elections from 1868-1990.
For years 1990 and onward for senate and gubernatorial elections, and for years 2000 and 2004
for presidential elections, we use data on county-level vote totals from ﬁles purchased from David
Leip through uselectionatlas.org. For years 1990-1996, we use data on county-level vote totals for
presidential elections from USA Counties 1998. We do not have a source for county-level vote
totals in congressional elections after 1990.
From the ﬁles provided by Snyder, we obtain vote totals by party and year at the congressional
40district level for congressional elections, as well as the major party afﬁliation of the incumbent can-
didate (if any), from 1868-2004. When the winning candidate ran on both a major and minor party
ticket, we coded the major party as the incumbent candidate’s party in the subsequent election.
The ﬁles provided by Snyder contain a crosswalk from counties to congressional districts by
year for 1868-1988. We use this crosswalk to match newspaper locations to congressional districts.
A small number of county-years are not matched to congressional districts. We do not have a
source for matching counties to congressional districts after 1988.
We obtain data on the number of eligible voters by county and year for 1868-1972 from ICPSR
8611. These data are constructed through a linear interpolation of decennial Census ﬁgures using
age, race, sex and citizenship criteria. We supplement these data through 2004 using a linear
interpolation of decennial Census ﬁgures that follows the methodology of ICPSR 8611. For the
year 1972, in which our calculations overlap with ICPSR 8611, the two estimates are close on
average.
We obtain data on the timing of redistricting at the state level through 1980 from Martis’ (1982)
Historical Atlas of United States Congressional Districts.
C Robustness Checks
In appendix table 1, we show how our key results vary with alternative deﬁnitions of our key
independent variables, dependent variables, sample, and controls. The columns of the table show
(1) estimated effects of newspaper entries and exits on presidential turnout (corresponding to table
3 column 3), and (2) estimated effects of partisan newspaper entry and exits on Republican vote
share (corresponding to table 7 column 3).
The ﬁrst row of the table repeats the results from our main speciﬁcations for reference.
The second row of the table truncates changes in our independent variables at 1 and -1.
The third row of the table restricts the sample to counties that contain only one city that ever has
a newspaper entry or exit in our sample, and that are not part of a Primary Metropolitan Statistical
Area as of 1990.
The fourth row of the table presents the cumulative effect of events over the event period plus
one period following.
The ﬁfth row of the table adds as a control a third-order polynomial interacted with time in a
ten-year window around events.
The sixth row of the table adds as a control time trends in a ten-period window around events
41that are restricted to have the same lead and lag pattern as the estimated “effect” of events on
population. This speciﬁcation implements a bias correction motivated by the discussion in section
4.2.2.
The seventh and eighth rows of the table allow separate effects for “small” events and “large”
events. In column (1), small and large events are distinguished by whether the absolute change in
circulation per eligible voter is less than or greater than 10 percent. In column (2), small and large
events are distinguished by whether the absolute change in the difference between the Republican
and Democratic share of circulation is less than or greater than 20 percent.
The ninth row of the table excludes counties with border changes in the decades 1870-1960.
The tenth row of the table excludes newspapers that are observed in only one presidential
election year, i.e. whose “lifespans” are fewer than four years according to our data.
42Table 1: Market structure transition matrix
After
Before 0 1 2 3 4+
0 newspapers 1419 294 53 48
1 newspaper 574 831 103 20
2 newspapers 39 1061 532 86
3 newspapers 8 60 657 292
4+ newspapers 0 8 69 354
Notes: Table shows number of county-years in sample experiencing a given transition. Time period is
1868-2004.
43Table 2: Partisan afﬁliation and newspaper content
Republican Share of Candidate Mentions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Republican afﬁliation 0.1824 0.1571 0.1855 0.1585
(permanent) (0.0277) (0.0324) (0.0287) (0.0967)
Republican vote share 0.1858
(0.0850)
Constant 0.3003 0.2135 0.2980 0.3153
(0.0167) (0.0359) (0.0176) (0.0533)
Sample All All Currently Independent?
No Yes
Newspaper-years 444 423 377 67
R2 0.2539 0.2591 0.2726 0.3339
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by newspaper. Time period is 1872-1928. All
speciﬁcations include year ﬁxed effects. Each observation is a newspaper-year. Dependent variable
is the number of search hits for the Republican presidential and vice-presidential candidate divided








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Number of political newspapers 0.0072 0.0037
(0.0013) (0.0010)
Number of non-political newspapers 0.0137 -0.0022
(0.0046) (0.0028)
F  test of equality of coefﬁcients 2.122 3.639
p value 0.1454 0.0567
R2 0.816 0.579
Number of counties 1195 1195
Number of county-years 15627 15627
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county. Time period is 1868-1928. Models are
estimated in ﬁrst differences. All speciﬁcations include state-year ﬁxed effects and demographic controls
as deﬁned in section 2.3, with dummies included for missing data. Non-political newspapers are those that
identify themselves as commercial, ﬁnancial, legal, trade, or other types of publications unlikely to
emphasize political news. All other newspapers are classiﬁed as political. See section 2 for details.





 1 newspaper 0.2470 0.0098 0.0121
(0.0082) (0.0027) (0.0033)
 2 newspapers 0.1030 -0.0018 -0.0050
(0.0068) (0.0022) (0.0032)
 3 newspapers 0.0710 0.0052 0.0030
(0.0067) (0.0024) (0.0034)
At least one Republican and -0.0023
one Democratic paper (0.0040)
F  test of equality of coefﬁcients 146.8 5.949 —
p value 0.0000 0.0027 —
R2 0.500 0.579 0.578
Number of counties 1181 1195 1168
Number of county-years 11281 15627 12515
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county. Time period is 1868-1928. Models are
estimated in ﬁrst differences. All speciﬁcations include state-year ﬁxed effects and demographic controls






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































48Table 7: The effect of partisan newspaper entry/exit on Republican vote share
Circulation Presidential Congressional
Rep Share - Dem Share Vote Share Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(#Rep - #Dem) newspapers 0.5096 0.0002 0.0002 0.0021
(0.0135) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0018)
Demographic controls? yes no yes yes
R2 0.586 0.735 0.736 0.351
Number of counties 1181 1195 1195 1191
Number of county-years 11281 15401 15401 14295
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county. Time period is 1868-1928. Models are
estimated in ﬁrst differences. All speciﬁcations include state-year ﬁxed effects. Demographic controls are
changes in county demographics as deﬁned in section 2.3, with dummies included for missing data.
49Table 8: Vote share effects by number of newspapers
Circulation Presidential Congressional
Rep Share - Dem Share Vote Share Vote Share
(1) (2) (3)
(#Rep - #Dem) newspapers:
1 newspaper 0.9472 0.0007 0.0025
(0.0055) (0.0017) (0.0031)
2 newspapers 0.4586 0.0011 0.0043
(0.0045) (0.0012) (0.0025)
3+ newspapers 0.2715 -0.0003 0.0008
(0.0067) (0.0011) (0.0020)
F  test of equality of coefﬁcients 7455.9 0.582 0.940
p value 0.000 0.559 0.391
R2 0.911 0.736 0.351
Number of counties 1181 1195 1191
Number of county-years 11281 15401 14295
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county. Time period is 1868-1928. Models are
estimated in ﬁrst differences. All speciﬁcations include state-year ﬁxed effects and demographic controls
as deﬁned in section 2.3, with dummies included for missing data.





 1 newspaper -0.0170 -0.0432
(0.0183) (0.0597)
 2 newspapers 0.0019 -0.0139
(0.0112) (0.0339)
 3 newspapers -0.0136 -0.0193
(0.0112) (0.0285)
R2 0.583 0.388
Number of districts 319 355
Number of district-years 901 1206
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by district. Time period is 1868-1928. Models are
estimated in ﬁrst differences. All speciﬁcations include state-year ﬁxed effects and demographic controls
as deﬁned in section 2.3, with dummies included for missing data. Congressional incumbent vote share is
the share of the two-party vote received by the incumbent candidate. Uncontested incumbent is a dummy
for whether the incumbent candidate received more than 95 percent of the total vote. Sample excludes
district-years in which there is no incumbent in the current or previous presidential election year, the
incumbent in the current or previous presidential election year was neither Republican nor Democratic, or
there was a redistricting in the state between the current and previous presidential election year.
51Figure 1 Summary statistics




































































































































































































































































































































































3+ newspapers 2 newspapers
1 newspaper
Notes: Panel A shows the number of English-language daily newspapers by year in presidential election years. Panel
B shows the number of counties with a given number of newspapers in each presidential election year.





































































































































































Losing Papers Gaining Papers
Notes: Figure shows the number of counties experiencing an increase/decrease in the number of English-language
daily newspapers between a given presidential election year and the previous presidential election year.
53Figure 3 Changes in population around newspaper entries/exits




































































































Years Relative to Change in Number of Newspapers










































































































Years Relative to Change in Number of Newspapers
Notes: Panel A shows coefﬁcients from a regression of change in log(voting-eligible population) on a vector of leads
and lags of the change in the number of newspapers (see equation 3 for details). Panel B shows coefﬁcients from a
regression of innovation in log(voting-eligible population) on a vector of leads and lags of the change in the number
of newspapers (see equation 3 for details). Innovation in a variable is its residual from a regression of the variable on
10 lags of the variable and of the event indicator. Models include state-year ﬁxed effects. Error bars are 2 standard
errors. Standard errors are clustered by county. Time period is 1868-1928.
































































































Years Relative to Change in Number of Newspapers
Notes: Figure shows coefﬁcients from a regression of change in readership per eligible voter on a vector of leads and
lags of the change in the number of newspapers (see equation 3 for details). Models include state-year ﬁxed effects.
Error bars are 2 standard errors. Standard errors are clustered by county. Time period is 1868-1928.
55Figure 5 Presidential turnout and newspaper entries/exits

































































































Years Relative to Change in Number of Newspapers
 actual  predicted

































































































Years Relative to Change in Number of Newspapers
Notes: Panel A shows coefﬁcients from a regression of change in turnout per eligible voter on a vector of leads and
lags of the change in the number of newspapers (see equation 3 for details). “Actual” refers to estimated coefﬁcients.
“Predicted” refers to estimated coefﬁcients using as a dependent measure the change in turnout predicted from de-
mographics as deﬁned in section 2.3. Panel B shows coefﬁcients from a regression of change in turnout per eligible
voter, controlling for demographics, on a vector of leads and lags of the change in the number of newspapers. Models
include state-year ﬁxed effects. Error bars are 2 standard errors. Standard errors are clustered by county. Time
period is 1868-1928.



























































































Years Relative to Change in (#Rep−#Dem)
Notes: Figure shows coefﬁcients from a regression of changes in the difference between the Republican and Demo-
cratic share of newspaper readership on a vector of leads and lags of changes in the difference in the number of
Republican and Democratic newspapers (see equation 3 for details). Models include state-year ﬁxed effects. Error
bars are 2 standard errors. Standard errors are clustered by county. Time period is 1868-1928.
57Figure 7 Republican vote share and newspaper entries/exits




























































































Years Relative to Change in (#Rep−#Dem)
 actual  predicted




























































































Years Relative to Change in (#Rep−#Dem)
Notes: Panel A shows coefﬁcients from a regression of change in Republican share of two-party vote on a vector of
leads and lags of changes in the difference in the number of Republican and Democratic newspapers (see equation 3
for details). “Actual” refers to estimated coefﬁcients. “Predicted” refers to estimated coefﬁcients using as a dependent
measure the change in Republican share of two-party vote predicted from state-year ﬁxed effects alone. Panel B shows
coefﬁcients from a regression of change in Republican share of two-party vote, controlling for state-year ﬁxed effects,
on a vector of leads and lags of changes in the difference in the number of Republican and Democratic newspapers.
Error bars are 2 standard errors. Standard errors are clustered by county. Time period is 1868-1928.
58Appendix Table 1: Robustness checks
Turnout Vote Share
(1) Baseline 0.0034 0.0002
(0.0009) (0.0010)
(2) Truncated event variable 0.0047 0.0002
(0.0012) (0.0011)
(3) Isolated markets 0.0043 0.0028
(0.0019) (0.0019)
(4) 8-year cumulative effect 0.0037 -0.0011
(0.0012) (0.0013)
(5) Allowing for smooth trends 0.0033 0.0000
(0.0010) (0.0010)
(6) Allowing for restricted trends 0.0039 0.0002
(0.0011) (0.0010)
(7) Small events 0.0030 0.0007
(0.0024) (0.0024)
(8) Large events 0.0041 0.0008
(0.0025) (0.0019)
(9) Excluding counties with 0.0038 0.0005
border changes (0.0012) (0.0010)
(10) Excluding short-lived 0.0031 -0.0018
newspapers (0.0010) (0.0011)
Notes: See appendix C for details.
59